The Nile: Riparian Conflict

Hello to the readers of The Politics of Water! This edition is a look at our next hyropolitical topic: international water relations.

The study is centred around the Nile River in Africa and the international relations of its 'riparian' states - the different countries which have access to the river. The Nile borders some 11 countries, and for Sudan and Egypt, provides their primary water supply. Usage of the river has long been a controversial topic within hydropolitical relations, with different riparian states taking different interpretations of what is fair and 'reasonable'.

The Nile River (Source: Quora 2016)

Historically, the most dominant power in these relations has been Egypt, who have politically regarded water supply as a matter of national security, subsequently threatening military force when other riparian states increase their usage, and subsequently threaten their supply.

There is a vast history of treaties (both signed and renounced) between all of the riparian states of the Nile, but there are a few which are particularly important:

• The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1929 and its updated 1959 agreement: a colonial water legislation granting Egypt 55 billion cubic metres per year and 18.5 billion to Sudan. This is the legislation held as current and valid by Egypt for its policy. Gives Egypt VETO powers over any upstream construction on the Nile.
• The Co-operative framework agreement of 2010: signed by five nations, but firmly denied by Egypt and Sudan. The agreement would have allowed developing countries to build irrigation infrastructure for development, "without having to ask permission from Egypt" (Brookings 2015)
• The Helsinki Rules on uses of international rivers: this 1966 agreement is cited by many of the prominent riparian states as a reasoning for increased usage - they see Egypt's usage as beyond the "reasonable use" provisioned within the Helsinki rules. 

(Credits: Al Jazeera 2018)

As shown above, the Nile Water Agreements of 1929/1959 are incredibly important to the region.

What are the political conflicts? 

Unsurprisingly given the extensive power granted to Egypt through the 1959 agreement, the majority of hydropolitical tension occurs between Egypt and the remaining 10 states. Many of the major upstream nations, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, argue that the 1959 agreement is invalid on several grounds. Firstly, the agreement is simply an updated version of the 'Anglo-Egyptian' treaty - a treaty made with Britain during its colonial occupation - now that all of the countries the Nile passes through are independent from colonial rule, this legislation is outdated. Secondly, a treaty which negotiates a usage and water rights for an 11 state water source should be agreed by more than 2 nations, thus the other riparian nations refuse to adhere to a treaty they were not part of. As argued by Mendler de Suarez (2018), it might be time for water politics in the region to focus upon regional human development rather than political control. This would mean supply allocations based upon needs for growth in the region for development projects in poorer nations such as Ethiopia and South Sudan and a more fluid negotiation compared to the current stance of long set treaties. 

One of the key tensions, which we'll cover in the next edition, has been between Egypt and Ethiopia, regarding plans for a new Ethiopian dam on the Nile. Egypt continues to regard water as a matter of national security and subsequently fears are arising of a 'war over water' if the project is carried out (BBC 2018).

So how can the region avoid a 'water war'? 

There is a range of schools of thought regarding this, both academic and political, and as shown in Ruedi Küng's (2003) paper, sometimes a combination of both. This is in reference to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) a proposed solution with 9 of the riparian states signed in 1991 to build a centralised database of hydrological and socioeconomic needs of the nations accessing the Nile, pragmatically adjusting water allocation dependent on individual needs. Despite the database being rejected, it opened a possibility of equitable discussion amongst the nations, and this argument aligns with much of the academic literature regarding solutions to the issue. These include political scientist Mendler de Suarez's paper, and economic perspectives such as Van Bruegel et. al (2010), who intrinsically link water allocation with productivity and socioeconomic development for the region, claiming there is a balance to be found between encouraging development in the poorest nations and hindering growth in the rapidly increasing populations and economies of nations such as Ethiopia and Egypt.

Politically, suggested solutions have tended to be much less pragmatic. Egypt and Sudan have continued to defend their 'inherited rights' to the Nile, refusing to sign treaties such as the Corporate Framework Agreement of 2010 because of its failure to protect this power (Seifulaziz 2013). In 2015, their position on the inherited power appeared to be changing, signing what appeared to be a landmark agreement between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, granting permission to build a large Dam on the Nile and increase water use. However, as we will find out in the next blog, this agreement is all but meaningless three years later.

The Grand Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia. (Credits: CNN 2018)

The powers attributed to Egypt and Sudan by the Nile Waters Agreements of 1929 and 1959 , combined with the militant rhetoric of Egypt regarding the Nile, have prevented peaceful re negotiation to what many will argue is an outdated mandate of the water source. Based upon the academic literature, one would suggest that the only way for the region to socioeconomically develop as a whole would be to equitably distribute the water supply based upon development needs, easing both domestic and international equity demands (Menga 2016). However, the only feasible way for this to be achieved is if Egypt renounces its long standing VETO to upstream states' usage, by signing and ratifying the CFA (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2018).

One thing is for certain, with an ever increasing population and plans for infrastructural expansion by many of the upstream states, Egypt's persistence to hold on to its historic powers is going to be a cause for serious hydro-political tension on the Nile.