Water War? Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam
Last edition of The Politics of Water we looked at the riparian conflict of the Nile, namely between two of the largest users, Egypt and Ethiopia. To recap, we left the profile of the situation as potentially changing, through an agreement in 2015 between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, allowing the construction of a new major dam on the Nile, but the situation remained tense due to Egypt's reluctancy to relinquish control of the river.
Well, as this news article from last week shows, the situation is still geopolitically very tense.
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| Credits: Quartz Africa 07/11/2018 |
What will the dam mean for the Nile?
- It will be the new largest dam in Ethiopia, overtaking the previous Tezeke dam. The dam will provide 6.45 gigawatts of electricity for Ethiopia, making it Africa's largest H.E power plant (Ethiopian Herald 2017).
- The dam will hold up to 70 million cubic metres of water, nearly equal to the Nile's annual flow, filling in a period of 5-15 years from completion (Quartz 2018).
- The dam could lead to a serious reduction in flow for Egypt, which relies entirely upon the Nile for its water supply. This has led to tension in the negotiations of usage limits between Ethiopia and Egypt.
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| The Grand Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia. (Credits: Middle East monitor 2018) |
Water War?
We asked the question last week whether Egypts determination to hold on to its VETO powers, combined with its agressive policy regarding hydropolitics, would lead to a water war. Will the Grand renaissance dam in Ethiopia lead to this? Its unlikely, for several reasons.
Firstly, the dam itself has encountered many setbacks during construction, initially aiming to be completed by 2020, even that target is now in doubt. This gives a longer period for negotiation to take place, and an agreement to be realised, however it is yet to be seen if an equitable use agreement between the two nations could be found, particularly as Egypt refuses to start the dam until its 55 billion cubic metres of the NWA is ensured. The triparte committee of the 3 stakeholder nations in the Dam are meeting regularly to discuss the usage, and the longer the dam takes to build, the greater the chance of a peaceful solution.
Secondly, as commented by Whittington et. al (2014) in their paper, the dam could be a cause for co-operation in the region. In this paper, it's argued that the GRD is actually in the interest of Egypt, as hydropower development on the Blue Nile will lead Ethiopia away from irrigation as its (massively increasing) population's main source of water use, and thus decrease future downstream reductions for Egypt, as said by Whittington et. al "The GRD is Ethiopia’s first big step on a hydropower
water development path for the Blue Nile, and Egypt should encourage Ethiopia to choose this
option".
Outcomes of the situation
Despite an agressive foreign policy regarding water security, looking at the academic and news coverage of the GRD, it does not seem likely that this will cause a water war. Ethiopia has already build 2 other major hydro-dams on the Blue Nile, and with the extended build time of the GRD and capital invested, it is in Ethiopia's interest to reach an agreement, as well as in Egypt's in the long term. What is likely to be the key turning point in the negotiation, as discussed last week, is the 55 billion cubic metres Egypt demands as part of the Nile Waters Agreements, if the Triparte committee can agree a reduction from this level, it would be a great step forward in hydropolitics on the Nile. Furthermore, if the GRD is completed and an equitable use agreement ratified, this could be an exciting development opportunity for Ethiopia and the surrounding states.Thanks for reading The Politics of Water, until next time!
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