Asleep at the wheel? Lake Chad and the 30 million people

In this blog series, we've covered several different hydropolitical events and case studies, with different applications of hydropolitical governance. In most of the cases, such as Cape Town, it tends to be a case of poor management leading to the brink of crisis, before intervention saves the day.

However in the case of Lake Chad, this is a hydropolitical crisis which has been unfolding since 1973. Lake Chad is primarily in Chad, bordering the north-east of Nigeria, south-east of Niger and North of Cameroon (see map below.)

Lake Chad (Credits: World Bank 2016) 

Lake Chad is a case study in nearly all of the factors which we've looked at within water and politics up to this point - a transboundary water source, riddled with political and military conflict and increasingly diminishing supplies which threaten a large population relying upon the lake. We'll split the blog into the three main crisis points of the situation and look at how this is widely applicable within Africa.

Environmental

Lake Chad's ultimate crisis is stemmed from climate change. Since 1973, the lake has reduced in size by 90% (ARB 2018), coinciding with steady population growth in the area of 3.5% annually. Alongside this increasing population, the water source has remained one of the key sources of food through livestock, fishing and agriculture but also through exports reliant upon irrigation. Forecasts for the lake are not positive, with the World Bank expecting the population to double by 2030, further increasing water demands in the region (World Bank 2016). According to the UN FAO (2009), fish production has reduced by 60%, and animal feed reduction by 45%. As the main rivers in the region, the Chari and Logone, continue to diminish the outlook for future water security is poor. 

As commented by Ndehedede et. al (2016), climatic variability in the region has often inhibited its growth, with frequent droughts and high intensity weather events which appear to be intensifying with human influence. Between 1960 and 2000, the region where the lake is located experienced one of the most substantial and sustained reduction in rainfall events recorded anywhere in the world (IPCC, 2001). 

Political

There are several academic lines of thought on this topic, including an interesting relationship raised by Agbiboa et al (2017) between water scarcity and extremism in the region. Other views are concerned with the environmental outlook, such as Okpara et. al (2015) who raised the point that the large scale disruption of being one of the world's most water-stricken places has caused political unrest in the region, even breaking into physical riots. A combination of both comes with the work of Agbiboa (2017), who argues that the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) set up to combat extremism in the region could be an effective model for building improved cross-border cooperation over the use of the lake's water supply.

"Women sifting through the remains of a market blown up during a Boko Haram attack on Amarwa near Maiduguri in September" Credits: FT, AFP 2018.

These are the main issues facing the Lake Chad politically:

• From 2002, socioeconomic deprivation in the region led to the rise of Boko Haram, an islamist extremist group. They have carried out a series of attacks from inception to the modern day, most recently an attack on the village of Daboua, which killed 18 (The National 2018). 
• Until 2014, attempts to halt the rise of extremism were domestically coordinated by the military, which was ineffective. This led to the previously mentioned MNJTF.
• The conflict, as well as killing hundreds, has led to a diversion of national and international funding away from a drastic plan (discussed later) to reduce water scarcity in the region. 
• Refugees from Boko Haram's spread are forced into concentrated regions, further increasing water demands and pressures (FT 2018).
• Trade in the region is highly productive, but a conflict has arisen where water supplies are not adequate to suffice both trade and the resident population (Afouda 1996, Evans and Mohieldeen 2002)
• Governments such as Nigeria's are beginning to be seen to have lost control of the region, with little feasible planning for a solution to the crisis and reliance upon international intervention to assist with Boko Haram. 
• Poor planning and development frameworks in the region have allowed HDI to fall significantly, putting pressure upon IGOs and national governments alike to create solutions. A new 'working group' has been established as a result between the nations involved, NGOs and international governments seeking to assist in enhancing development in the region (World Bank 2018).

Proposed Solutions

Part of the issue in Lake Chad is that this section is particularly thin on the ground. The surrounding nations (Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon) have been struggling with socioeconomic development for much of the time this crisis has been unfolding. Resultantly, little budget has been available for infrastructure funding.

The grandest of all of the proposed solutions came in the form of the Replenishment project of the late 1990s. This proposed a 2,400km channel from the Congo Basin to Lake Chad, to stem the recession of the water supply. The project was seriously considered by the Lake Chad commission (resident states), yet factors including Congo's concern it would hinder the Inga Hydro-Dam and the fact the Congo Basin itself was receding meant the plan was never carried out. 

The working group regarding Lake Chad is currently working on several development plans alongside organisations such as the African Development Bank and Islamic Development Fund to improve socioeconomic conditions in the region. The region is now subject to frequent proposals to solve the drought (e.g from the US). However, one of the main causes of this crisis, aside from budgetary constraints, is that there has not been a coordinated framework with all the nation states to cooperate towards development.

If we look at the situation holistically, there's clearly a variety of causal and resultant factors influencing water and politics in the region. The rise of the extremist group Boko Haram is both arguably resultant of the desperation in the region, but also is hindering the efforts by IGOs, NGOs and national governments. Without a unilateral plan of action to stem the crisis and improve conditions in the region, increasing populations (increasingly densely packed in refugee communities) interacting with increased climatic volatility in the region looks set to maintain the political unrest in Lake Chad.